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Abstract
A scalable and analytically tractable probabilistic model for the cascading failure dynamics in power grids is
constructed while retaining key physical attributes and operating characteristics of the power grid. The
approach is based upon extracting a reduced abstraction of large-scale power grids using a small number of
aggregate state variables while modeling the system dynamics using a continuous-time Markov chain. The
aggregate state variables represent critical power-grid attributes, which have been shown, from prior
simulation-based and historical-data-based analysis, to strongly influence the cascading behavior. The transition
rates among states are formulated in terms of certain parameters that capture grid's operating characteristics
comprising loading level, error in transmission-capacity estimation, and constraints in performing load shedding.
The model allows the prediction of the evolution of blackout probability in time. Moreover, the asymptotic
analysis of the blackout probability enables the calculation of the probability mass function of the blackout size.
A key benefit of the model is that it enables the characterization of the severity of cascading failures in terms of
the operating characteristics of the power grid..

SECTION I. Introduction
While power grids are reliable systems, they have experienced large cascading-failure blackouts at enormous
costs. A large number of physical attributes of the power grid, such as voltage and frequency at various points in
the grid, power-flow distribution, and the functionality of the grid's components, determine the state of the
power grid at each time. Various events, such as contingencies, control actions, and demand changes, may alter
the state of the system. Cascading failures in power grids can be described as successive changes of power-grid
states, for instance, due to component failures, transmission-line tripping, voltage instability, phase mismatch,
and changes in power-flow distribution. However, the analytical modeling of the evolution of the detailed
system state during cascading failures may not be feasible. This is mainly due the large space of power-grid
states and the large number of parameters affecting the states, not to mention the complexity of the
interactions between the physical attributes and the stochastic dynamics of states. Besides the physical
attributes of the power grid, its operating characteristics (e.g., the power-grid loading level) also affect the
interactions among components and the cascading behavior of the power grid. For example, the cascadingfailure models reported in [1] and [2] do show that there are critical transitions in the cascading behavior as the
load of the system is elevated. Moreover, as power grids become more reliant on the communication and
control systems for their daily operation, a new set of operational characteristics pertaining to control and
communication systems begin to influence cascading failures [3].
In the past two decades, researchers have exerted considerable efforts in modeling and understanding
cascading failures in power systems. Among such efforts is the class of probabilistic models [2], [4]–[5][6][7].
However, many of the existing probabilistic models suffer from a disconnect between the parameters of the
abstract models they employ and the physical and operating characteristics of the system. We believe that a
probabilistic model for cascading failures that exhibits a clear connection between its abstract parameters and
the physical and operational characteristics of the system will provide further insight into the cascading
behavior.
In this paper, we present an approach that aims to balance the tradeoff that exists between the scalability and
analytical tractability of probabilistic models for cascading failures, on the one hand, and the level of details in
the description of the physical and operational characteristics that can be embedded in the model on the other
hand. Specifically, we construct a scalable and analytically tractable probabilistic model for cascading failure
dynamics while retaining certain key physical attributes and operating characteristics of the power grid. This is
accomplished by defining a reduced abstraction of the detailed power-grid state space (a small set of
equivalence classes) by means of identifying a few aggregate state variables based upon our analysis of power-

system simulations and historical data. The aggregate state variables describe the physical attributes of the
power-grid states and govern the cascading failure behavior. The stochastic dynamics of cascading failures are
then modeled by the sequence of stochastic transitions among the “abstract” states according to a continuoustime Markov chain. We term the model presented in this paper the stochastic abstract-state evolution (SASE)
model. The state-dependent transition rates of the SASE model are formulated in terms of the operating
characteristics of the power grid including power-grid loading level, transmission-capacity estimation error, and
the constraints in implementing load shedding.
The SASE model offers two major contributions beyond existing stochastic models for cascading failures. First, it
enables the prediction of the evolution of the blackout probability in terms of key power-grid operating
characteristics, which is an expansion of our earlier work [6]. Second, and more importantly, it enables an
asymptotic analysis that leads to the analytical characterization of the probability mass function of the blackout
size as well as the severity of cascading failures in terms of the key power-grid operating characteristics. We
emphasize that the proposed concept of reducing the space of the detailed power-grid states is key in the
scalability and analytical tractability of the SASE model.

SECTION II. Related Work
In the last two decades, a great volume of work has been devoted to understanding and analyzing cascading
failures in power grids (see [8] for a review). Efforts in modeling cascading failures in power grids can be
categorized into three classes: analysis of cascading failures using power-system simulations [1], [9],
deterministic analytical models [10], and probabilistic analytical models [2], [4]–[5][6][7]. Here, we review the
probabilistic analytical models for cascading failures.
The work by Brummitt et al. [4] and the CASCADE model by Dobson et al. [2] model cascading failures triggered
by initial load increments on certain components of the system. In both models, failures occur due to
overloaded components and the cascading failure develops as a result of redistribution of loads among the
remaining components. However, the redistribution of loads are based upon simple assumptions; for example,
the CASCADE model assumes loads will be added equally to the components of the system as a result of failures.
The probabilistic analytical models based upon branching processes [5], [11], [12] have also emerged, providing
an analytical framework to study the statistical properties of cascading failures such as the probability
distribution of blackout size. Reported branching-process approaches model cascading failures by considering
generations of failures, whereby each failure in each generation independently produces a random number of
subsequent failures in the next generation, and so on. In [11] and [12], the authors estimate the failure
generation parameter of the branching process model for cascading failures using historical outage datasets.
Notably, in [12] the authors account for varying failure generation parameter as the cascade progresses instead
of a fixed parameter as in [11]. However, different from the work presented in the current paper, the work
in [12] assumes that all line outages are homogeneous in their type.
Recently, we developed a scalable probabilistic approach [6], based upon regeneration theory and a reduced
state space of the power grid, to model the dynamics of cascading failures in time. The transition rates among
the states of the model are defined to be state- and age-dependent, and they are calculated empirically from
power-system simulations. This renewal-based approach can collapse to a Markov process; however, it can also
capture the stochastic events when the underlying events are non-Markovian. The independent and concurrent
work by Wang et al. [7] provides a Markov-transition model for cascading failures. The transition probabilities
among states are derived from a stochastic model for line overloading using a stochastic flow redistribution
model based upon dc power-flow equations. This model enables simulating the progression of cascading failures
and its time span. However, due to the analytical complexity of the time-varying transition probabilities the
analytical and asymptotic characterization of probabilistic metrics such as the blackout probability and

distribution of the blackout size is not possible. In this paper, we present a scalable probabilistic model for the
stochastic dynamics of cascading failures based upon a continuous-time Markov chain framework that captures
key physical attributes of the power grid through its parameters and the novel definition of its reduced state
space.

SECTION III. Abstract State Space of Power Grids
Our power-system simulations [6], as well as available historical blackout data [13]–[14][15], all suggest that the
functionality status of transmission lines and their power-flow capacities [16] are key physical attributes that
should be considered in modeling cascading failures. The importance of these attributes are clear as line failures
have always been a part of historical large blackouts and the capacity of transmission lines determine the
power-delivery capacity of the grid. For simplicity, we term the nonfunctional lines (e.g., lines that are tripped by
protection relays, overheated, or physically failed) the failed lines. Even in the case where only the functionality
status of the mtransmission lines of the system are considered, the size of the state space of the power grid is
exponential in m.
We consider three aggregate state variables to represent the power-grid state. The first variable is the number
of failed lines, 𝐹𝐹, which has been commonly considered in the probabilistic modeling of cascading failures to
represent power-grid states [1], [5], [7], [12]. Next, we consider the maximum of the capacities of all of the
failed lines, 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . Our simulations presented in [6] have shown that 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 dominates the effect of the capacity
of the failed lines in cascading failures. Finally, our simulations presented in [6] have shown that certain powergrid states are cascade-stable, defined as a state for which once entered no further failures occur in the system.
Accordingly, we define a new aggregate state variable, termed cascade-stability, which collectively captures
many other physical attributes of the power grid (as the physical attributes specify whether a power-grid state is
cascade-stable or not). We represent the cascade-stability by a binary state variable 𝐼𝐼, where 𝐼𝐼 = 1 indicates a
cascade-stable state and 𝐼𝐼 = 0 indicates otherwise.

Here, we employ an expanded notion of equivalence classes of power-grid states compared to what we
originally proposed in [6]. By utilizing the three introduced state variables as the descriptors of power-grid
states, we partition the space of all detailed power-grid states into a collection of equivalence classes, denoted
by 𝒮𝒮. Such coarse partitioning of the state space of the power grid implies that detailed power-grid states with
the same aggregate state-variable values (i.e., the same value of 𝐹𝐹, 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐼𝐼) will belong to one class and will
be indistinguishable as far as the reduced abstraction is concerned. We term each class of the power-grid states
an abstract power-grid state or in short an abstract state, and label each as 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 , 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ), where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒮𝒮.

The notion of power-grid states, abstract states, and transition between the abstract states is sketched in Fig. 1.
Each large circle represents an abstract state and each of the four topological graphs inside each large circle
represents a detailed power-grid state, albeit with common values for 𝐹𝐹, 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐼𝐼. We assume that the
power-flow capacity of the lines can be quantized into a discrete and finite set of capacity values, i.e., 𝒞𝒞 =
{𝐶𝐶1 , 𝐶𝐶2 , … , 𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾 }. Thus, the cardinality of the abstract-state space 𝒮𝒮 is 𝑁𝑁 = 2𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾. Therefore, the equivalence-class
approach reduces the complexity associated with tracking the stochastic dynamics of the power grid from
exponential to linear in 𝑚𝑚.

Fig. 1. Power-grid states, abstract states, and transitions between the abstract states.
Next, we provide two real scenarios of cascading failures from the historical blackout data that support the
dependency of the cascading behavior on 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . The time evolution of the cumulative line failures for the
blackouts in July 1996 and August 1996 in the Western Interconnection [13] are shown in Fig. 2(a). The number
of initial and final transmission-line failures are very close in these two blackouts. However, the approximate
average line-failure rate in the July 1996 blackout is 1.6 failures per minute during the escalation phase of the
cascading failures, while it is 4 failures per minute in the August 1996 blackout. Most notably, the initial
disturbance of the blackouts were two 345-KV transmission-line failures in the July 1996 blackout and two 500KV transmission-line failures in the August 1996 blackout. Next, the time evolution of the cumulative line failures
for the blackout in the August 2003 in Eastern Interconnection [15] is shown in Fig. 2(b). Based upon the data,
the average line-failure rate is approximately 1.4 failures per minute at the beginning phase while it is 18 failures
per minute at the escalation phase of cascading failures. This can be described by the larger number of failures
in the grid in the second phase as well as failure of some critical lines with high capacities. In summary, the
aforementioned observations extracted from historical data and our simulations both support the selection of
the capacity of the failed lines and the number of failures as key players in the formulation of the abstract state
space.

Fig. 2. Cumulative line failures in the (a) July 1996 WSCC blackout (solid line), August 1996 WSCC blackout
(dashed line), and (b) August 2003 blackout [13], [15]. The time of the initial failure is set to zero. The figures are
reproduced in the same way as in [5].

SECTION IV. SASE Cascading-Failure Model
The SASE model describes the stochastic dynamics of cascading failures using a finite state continuous-time
Markov chain whose state space is defined by the abstract states 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 , 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ) for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁𝑁. Recall
that the state variable 𝐼𝐼 indicates whether a state is cascade-stable or not; hence, it is utilized to specify the

absorbing (𝐼𝐼 = 1) and nonabsorbing (𝐼𝐼 = 0) states of the Markov chain. We term the nonabsorbing states as
transitory states.

We consider two types of state transitions in the SASE model. The first type is termed as cascade-stop transition,
which is from a transitory state, say 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , to an absorbing state, say 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 , (i.e., 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 0 and 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 1) such that 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 =
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . The cascade-stop transition leads to the end of the chain of failures, which in real systems
can occur as a result of the implementation of successful control actions, formation of operating islands in the
power grid, or occurrence of a large blackout. The second type of transitions is termed a cascade-continue
transition. We assume that the cascade-continue transition occurs as a result of a single line failure in the
system. The single-failure-per-transition approximation is based upon the assumption that time is divided into
sufficiently small intervals such that each interval can allow only a single failure event. By cascade-continue
transition we mean transition from a transitory state, say 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , to another transitory state, say 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 (i.e., 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 0)
such that 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 = 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 1 and 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . To this end, the cascading failure can be described as a sequence of
Markovian transitions among transitory states with a final transition to some absorbing state.

We represent the state of the system at time 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 by 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡), an 𝒮𝒮-valued, continuous-time Markov chain. The
transition probability matrix of the chain 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) is denoted by 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡), where its 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖th element is 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝖯𝖯{𝑋𝑋(𝜏𝜏 +
𝑡𝑡) = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 |𝑋𝑋(𝜏𝜏) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 }, 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0. Note that the notation 𝖯𝖯 is used to represent probability measure defined on the
collection (𝜎𝜎-algebra) ℱ of all events (subsets of the sample space Ω) generated by the random variables defined
in this paper.
Let 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 represent the probability rate of transition from state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 to state 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 , which depends upon the
origin and destination states of the transition. This dependency allows for cascading behavior and will be
explained in details in Section VI. The 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (ℎ)

,
𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗
ℎ
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � ℎ→0 1−𝑝𝑝 (ℎ)
(1)
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
, for 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗
− 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙+
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙+

ℎ→0

ℎ

where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 satisfies 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = − ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 [17]. A Markov chain 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) is completely determined by the transition
𝑗𝑗=1,𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
rate matrix 𝐐𝐐 with 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as its 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖th element.

We formulate the transition rates of the SASE model based upon the transition probabilities of its embedded
Markov chain (EMC). We denote the state of the EMC at discrete time instant ℓ by 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ). The one-step transition
probability matrix of the EMC is denoted by 𝐏𝐏 EMC . According to the definition of the SASE model, the elements
of 𝐏𝐏 EMC has the form given in (2), shown at the bottom of the page,
EMC
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

0,
𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 < 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 or 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 > 1 or 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 or(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 1 and 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖)
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 1 and 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑖𝑖
= �1,
(2)
𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ), otherwise

where 𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) represents the probability that the system transits from a transitory state, say 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , to
state 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 for which the value of 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 and 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 does not violate the transition rules in (2). In Section VI, we will
parametrically characterize 𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) based upon our observations from simulations.

EMC
We approximate 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 based upon (1) and for a small 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 as 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≈ (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
)/(Δ𝑡𝑡) for 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗. We consider 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 as (the
small) unit of time approximating the average time between failures during the rapid escalation phase of the
cascading behavior, which is relatively small compared with the total duration of cascading failures. We estimate

such 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 using the historical blackout data provided in [5] and [13]. However, note that, based upon the
individual blackout events, 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 may vary depending on the power system and its operating characteristics. For
example, historical data suggests approximately 18 transmission-line failures per minute on average during the
rapid escalation phase of the cascading failure for the August 2003 Eastern Interconnection blackout (Δ𝑡𝑡 ≈
0.055 min) [13] while this number is 4 failures per minute for the August 1996 Western Interconnection blackout
(𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ 0.25 min) [5]. In our calculations we have selected an intermediate value of Δ𝑡𝑡 ≈ 0.25 min. We emphasize
that, while we consider a fixed 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 for the system, it is the state-dependent nature of the transition
EMC
probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
that inherently adjusts the transition rates to accommodate all phases of cascading failures,
such as the precursor and escalation phases.

In Section V, we introduce our simulation methodology, which will be used in the parametric formulation
EMC
.
of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

SECTION V. Cascading-Failure Simulation
A. Overloading and Failure Mechanism

Here, we introduce our approach for simulating cascading failures resulting from line overloading. Our
simulations are based upon the dc power-flow equations as described in [18].
A transmission line has a power-flow capacity that can be governed by the thermal limit, the voltage drop limit,
or the steady-state stability limit of the line [16]. We denote the power-flow capacity of a transmission line, say
opt
opt
the 𝑘𝑘th line, by 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 . The 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 values of the transmission lines are used by the control center of the power grid
as constraints in the power-flow optimization framework (presented in Section V-C).

Similarly to the approach presented in [1], we consider a threshold 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 for the power flow through the kth line
above which the protection relay (e.g., circuit breaker or impedance protective relay) trips the line. Various
factors and mechanisms in the power grid may affect the threshold α for transmission lines. For example, the
line overloading may lead to smaller measured impedance than relay settings [19], the thermal power-flow
capacity of a transmission line may vary due to changes in the surrounding temperature and ambient weather
opt
conditions [20], or communication/control system problems may lead to inaccurate 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 assumption in the
control center. In all of these examples, the protection relay may trip the line when the power flow exceeds the
threshold 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 . Now, one may interpret the discrepancy between the threshold value 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 , which represents the
opt
true capacity of the line, and the nominal capacity 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 as an error by the control center in its estimation of the
opt

true capacity of the lines. By adopting this point of view, in this paper, we term 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 − 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 the capacity
estimation error. While the approach presented in [1] considers a fixed threshold, in this paper we assume
varying threshold to capture the effects of various parameters on the threshold and consequently on the
opt
opt
cascading behavior. In our simulations, we quantify Coptk−αk by a fraction of 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 , i.e., 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 − 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 =
opt

𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘

for 𝑒𝑒 ∈ [0,0.5]. Therefore, we assume a line is overloaded when the power flow through the line
opt

exceeds (1 − 𝑒𝑒)𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 . As such, the parameter e controls the capacity estimation error. Moreover, we categorize
all of the transmission lines in the power grid based upon their capacity values into five categories with values
from the set 𝒞𝒞 = {20 MW, 80 MW, 200 MW, 500 MW, 800 MW} [16]. Similarly to the work presented in [21], in
our simulations, we allow only one line trip at a time by randomly (according to the size of overload) tripping
one of the overloaded lines.
Studies of major blackouts have shown that incorrect operation of protection relays contributes to cascading
failures [13]. To capture this effect in our simulations, we have considered a small probability (0.04) for misoperation of protection relays. Due to space constraints, we will not investigate the effects of the mis-operation

of the protection relays on cascading behavior further. A study of such effects is presented in [22]. Finally, the
simulations in this paper use the IEEE 118-bus system. However, we also refer to our simulations of IEEE 300-bus
system for certain results to confirm the consistency of the observed trends.

B. Operating Characteristics of the Power Grid

In studying the cascading failures, we consider three power-grid operating characteristics as described below.

5.2.1 Capacity Estimation Error

Recall that in the previous subsection we introduced the parameter 𝑒𝑒, which captures the effects of various
factors and mechanisms that may lead to failure of transmission lines when their power flow is within a certain
range of the maximum (nominal) capacity assumed by the control center. We use the parameter 𝑒𝑒 to control the
capacity estimation error (as described in the previous subsection).

5.2.2 Power-Grid Loading Level

We denote the power-grid loading level by 𝑟𝑟, which is defined as the ratio of the total demand to generationcapacity of the power grid. The parameter 𝑟𝑟 represents the level of stress over the grid in terms of the loading
level of its components. Note that the N-1 security is ensured in all loading levels of the power grid.

5.2.3 Load-Shedding Constraint Level

Load shedding is a critical control action when the system must be reconfigured to accommodate the
disturbances on the power grid. In our earlier work [23], we have shown that the efficiency of the load shedding
in responding to cascading failures depends upon the constraints in implementing the load shedding in the
system. The constraint level is governed, for example, by control and marketing policies, regulations, physical
constraints, and communication limitations. The ratio of the uncontrollable loads (loads that do not participate
in load shedding) to the total load in the power grid is termed the load-shedding constraint, denoted by 𝜃𝜃 ∈
[0,1], where 𝜃𝜃 = 1 means load shedding cannot be implemented and 𝜃𝜃 = 0 means there is no constraint in
implementing the load shedding. The value of 𝜃𝜃 controls the level of controllability of the load shedding in our
simulations.
The effects of these parameters on the power-flow distributions are embedded in the power-flow optimization
framework as described in Section V-C.

C. Power-Flow Optimization Framework

For completeness, we summarize the power-flow optimization framework, introduced in our earlier
work [3], [23].
Consider the transmission system of a power grid with 𝒱𝒱 nodes (substations) interconnected by 𝑚𝑚 transmission
lines. The sets ℒ and 𝒢𝒢 are the set of load buses and the set of generator buses, respectively. The
notation 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 represents the demand at the load bus 𝑖𝑖. The dc power-flow equations [18] can be summarized as
~

~

𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 (3)
~

where 𝑃𝑃 is a power vector whose components are the input power of nodes in the grid (except the reference
~

generator), 𝐹𝐹 is a vector whose 𝑚𝑚 components are the power flow through the transmission lines, and 𝐴𝐴 is a
matrix whose elements can be calculated in terms of the connectivity of transmission lines in the power grid and
the impedance of the lines. This system of equations does not have a unique solution. Therefore, to find the
solution to this system, we use, as done in [1], a standard optimization approach with the objective of
minimizing the simple cost function that follows:

Cost = ∑𝑖𝑖∈𝒢𝒢 𝑤𝑤 𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + �

𝑗𝑗∈ℒ

𝑤𝑤 ℓ𝑗𝑗 ℓ𝑗𝑗 . (4)

A solution to this optimization problem is the pair 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 and ℓ𝑗𝑗 that minimizes the cost function in (4). Note
that ℓ𝑗𝑗 = 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 + 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 , where 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 will be determined by the optimization solution. In this cost
function, 𝑤𝑤 𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑤𝑤 ℓ𝑗𝑗 are positive values representing the generation cost for every node 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝒢 and the loadshedding price for every node 𝑗𝑗 ∈ ℒ, respectively. We assume a high price for load shedding so that a load is to
be curtailed only when there is generation inadequacy or transmission capacity limitations. The constraints for
this optimization problem are listed here.
~

~

1. DC power flow equations: 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃.
2. Limits on the generators' power: 0 ≤ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝒢.
3. Limits on the controllable loads: (1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 )𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 ≤ 0, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ ℒ.
~

opt

4. Limits on the power flow through the lines: |𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘 | ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 for 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚𝑚}.
5. Power balance constraints (power generated and consumed must be balanced): ∑𝑖𝑖∈𝒢𝒢
�

𝑗𝑗∈ℒ

ℓ𝑗𝑗 = 0.

𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 +

Note that, in the above formulation, the quantities ℓ𝑗𝑗 are negative and the 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 's are positive (by definition). The
operating parameter 𝑟𝑟 affects the initial load on the system, i.e., the 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 's. The solution to this optimization
problem determines the amount of load shed, generation, and the power flow through the lines. If failures occur
in the power grid, we assume that the control center redistributes the power in the grid by solving the above
optimization problem. If the new power-flow distribution overloads lines (based on the overload definition
in Section V.A), more failures will occur in the power grid. This process iterates until no more failures occur in
the system.
We use MATPOWER [24], which is a package of MATLAB m-files, for solving the optimal power flow and
simulating cascading failures. The quasi-static approaches that employ a power-flow distribution framework
together with a method to identify overloaded lines and individual failures to model cascading failures have
been used in several works in the literature such as [19], [21], and [25]. In Section VI, we will use simulations to
study the effects of the three introduced power-system operating characteristics on cascading failures and use
EMC
this understanding to parametrically formulate 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
.

SECTION VI. Transition Probabilities

Here, we parametrically model 𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) introduced in (2). In order to simplify the formulation of
the 𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ), we consider the probability components depicted in Fig. 3. We will introduce the components
represented in Fig. 3 as we go through this section and refer to this figure as necessary.

Fig. 3. Components of 𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ). First, transition from a transitory state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is divided into two categories:
transition to an absorbing state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ and transition to a transitory state (states in the dashed circles are transitory
states). Next, the transition to a transitory state is also divided into two categories: transition to a state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗ with
the same 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 values as that of 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , and transition to a state whose maximum capacity of the failed lines is larger
than 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 associated with the state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 .

Note that, for every transitory state, say 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒮𝒮, there is a single associated absorbing state, which we denote
by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ (see Fig. 3). Note that state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ has the same 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 values as those for 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 but it has 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ = 1 (where
as 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 0). Based upon whether the next state of the transition is an absorbing state or not, we decompose the
transition probability as follows:

𝑃𝑃trans �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 �

= 𝖯𝖯�𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ �
× 𝖯𝖯�𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 �

(5)

+𝖯𝖯�𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) ≠ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ �

× 𝖯𝖯�𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) ≠ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 �.

Note that 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ implies that cascading failure ends in the system. As such, we define the probability of
△

cascade-stop transition as 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝖯𝖯{𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 }. Clearly, 𝖯𝖯{𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) =
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ } = 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 , where 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 = 1 when 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 is equal to 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ and 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 = 0 otherwise. Moreover, we define 𝖯𝖯{𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) =
△

𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) ≠ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ } = (1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 )𝑃𝑃cont (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ), where 𝑃𝑃cont (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) is the conditional cascade-continue

transition probability. Thus, we rewrite (5) as

𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) = 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 )

+(1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 )𝑃𝑃cont (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 )(1 − 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 )) (6)

for 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝒮𝒮. Note that �

𝑁𝑁

𝑗𝑗=1

𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) = 1.

The rest of this section is devoted to the parametric representation of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑃𝑃cont (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ), and therefore,
the parametric formulation of 𝑃𝑃trans (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) due to (6).

SECTION A. Cascade-Stop Probability

Here, we will present simulation results that show the dependency of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) on 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . To simplify the
observation of the effects of 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 on 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ), we have studied 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 )as a function
(1)

(2)

of 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 individually represented, respectively, by 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ). In Appendix A, we present
a simple approach similar to the approach presented in [26] in conjunction with certain reasonable assumptions
(originated from the simulations of the power grid and power grid characteristics) to approximately
(1)

(2)

represent 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) in terms of a weighted superposition of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) as
(1)

(2)

𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) + (1 − 𝑤𝑤)𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) (7)

where, in our formulation, we simply set 𝑤𝑤 = 0.5.

(1)

(2)

Fig. 4(a) and (b) shows the simulation results of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), respectively, for the IEEE 118-bus
and the IEEE 300-bus systems. The IEEE 118-bus system has 186 transmission lines and the IEEE 300-bus systems
(1)

(2)

has 409 transmission lines. Note that 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) exhibit the same general behavior in both grids.
Due to the space constraints, we will limit our presentation to the IEEE 118-bus system with the knowledge that
a similar approach for the parametric modeling of transmission rates can be applied to larger scale grids by
adjusting the parameters of the model.

(2)
(1)
Fig. 4. (a) 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) and (b) 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) for the IEEE 118-bus system and the IEEE 300-bus system for 𝑟𝑟 =
0.7,𝑒𝑒 = 0.1, and 𝜃𝜃 = 0.
(1)

(2)

Figs. 5 and 6 show the simulation results of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) for the IEEE 118-bus system, respectively,
for different operating settings of the grid. The results of our simulations are obtained using 1000 scenarios of
random initial disturbances with two or three random line failures. We considered three different values of loadshedding constraint level 𝜃𝜃 in order to show that operating characteristics of the power grid affect the stability
probabilities while the value of 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑒𝑒 are fixed to be 0.7 and 0.1, respectively (the effects of 𝑟𝑟, and 𝑒𝑒 are
discussed in Section VI-C).

(1)

Fig. 5. Simulation results of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) for 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7,𝑒𝑒 = 0.1 and three values of 𝜃𝜃. The solid line is the parametric
approximated function when 𝜃𝜃 = 0.

(2)

Fig. 6. Simulation results of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) for 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑒 = 0.1 and three values of 𝜃𝜃. The solid line is the
parametric approximated function when 𝜃𝜃 = 0.
(1)

From Fig. 5, we observe that 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) is bowl-shaped, with three identifiable phases, which are described in

detail below. The importance of the bowl-shape form is that it reflects the general cascading behavior as failures
accumulate. A similar three-phase behavior can be observed in the historical cascading-failure data presented
in Fig. 2.

6.1.1 First Phase

This phase represents the regime when the likelihood of an additional failure increases substantially as a
function of the number of failures. A qualitatively similar increase in the failure propagation probability has also
been observed by Dobson [12]. This phase starts at 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 2 (due to N-1 security). To this end, we define the
(1)

parameter 𝑎𝑎1 as 𝑃𝑃stop (2), which represents, intuitively speaking, the reliability of the power grid to initial
(1)

disturbances with two failures. Also in the first phase, 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) decreases from 𝑎𝑎1 to a
(1)

small 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) value, 𝜖𝜖 (our results suggest 𝜖𝜖 = 0.05), as the number of failures increases and reaches a
critical 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎2 𝑚𝑚 value.

6.1.2 Second Phase

(1)

This phase represents the escalated phase of cascading failures. During this phase 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) is small (we
(1)

assume 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝜖𝜖 during this phase) and the power grid is highly vulnerable. This phase starts at 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎2 𝑚𝑚,
which represents the number of failures in the power grid after which the cascading failure enters the escalated
phase. As expected, our results show that, during this phase, the efficiency of the control action (represented
(1)

by 𝜃𝜃) hardly affects 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ).

6.1.3 Third Phase

As 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 increases further, the probability of having an additional failure decreases as cascading-failure behavior
begins to phase out. This behavior can be attributed to the finite size of the power grid or the fact that as more
failures occur “functional islands” may form in the grid, leading to the termination of cascading failures.
(1)

(1)

Therefore, in this phase, the value of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) rises, and, finally, 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑚𝑚) = 1. Note that, in this paper, we

(1)

simply consider a fixed parametric model for the third phase of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ), which only roughly approximates the
average scenario of various operating settings.
(1)

We propose the following parametric model to capture the three aforementioned phases in 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ):
(1)

𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 )

𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚−𝐹𝐹

2
𝑖𝑖 4
2 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑎2 𝑚𝑚
⎧𝑎𝑎1 ( 𝑎𝑎2𝑚𝑚 ) + 𝜖𝜖,
(8)
= 𝜖𝜖,
𝑎𝑎2 𝑚𝑚 < 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ≤ 0.6𝑚𝑚
⎨
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 −0.6𝑚𝑚 4
⎩𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{(𝑚𝑚−0.6𝑚𝑚) + 𝜖𝜖, 1}, 0.6𝑚𝑚 < 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑚.
(1)

The parametric 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) is shown in Fig. 5 for 𝜃𝜃 = 0. Recall that we have judiciously selected a common
parametric model for the third phase of the bowl-shaped function across various operating settings.
(1)

Consequently, the parametric function 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) shown in Fig. 5 does not accurately match the simulation
results for 𝜃𝜃 = 0 scenario in the third phase.
(2)

(2)

The empirically calculated 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) is shown in Fig. 6. The value of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) indicates, intuitively
speaking, the reliability of the power grid when the maximum capacity of the failed lines in the grid is Cmaxi.
(2)

Note that 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) decreases as 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 increases, which means that the power grid is more vulnerable to
additional failures when it has lost at least a line with a large capacity value. We also observe
(2)

that 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) decreases for all 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 values as 𝜃𝜃 increases; however, the effect of θ on the reliability is larger
when 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is smaller. This is because control actions are most effective when they are implemented in the
beginning phase of cascading failures where 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is more likely to be small.
(2)

The 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) is formulated parametrically as
(2)
𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 )
(2)

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝒞𝒞}

= 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑎𝑎3 �

(2)

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝒞𝒞}

4

� , 𝑎𝑎4 � (9)

(2)

where 𝑎𝑎3 ≜ 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝒞𝒞}) and 𝑎𝑎4 ≜ 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝒞𝒞}). The parametric function of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) is also shown (by
the solid line) in Fig. 6. This completes the parametric modeling of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) based on (7). In Section VI-C, we
show that the value of 𝑎𝑎1 , … , 𝑎𝑎4 are affected by 𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒, and 𝜃𝜃. In the SASE model, we will perceive the
parameters 𝑎𝑎1 , … , 𝑎𝑎4 beyond abstract model parameters but as parameters that govern the cascading behavior
while maintaining a physical connection to the operating characteristics of the system.

SECTION B. Cascade-Continue Probability

Recall that, for every transitory state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , there is only one transitory state with the same 𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 as that of
state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 and exactly one more failure than that for state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . We denote such state by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗ (see Fig. 3). Failure of a
line with capacity smaller than or equal to 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 results in transitioning from state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 to state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗. Similarly
to (5), depending on whether the next line failure has larger capacity than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 or not, we can write the
conditional cascade-continue transition probability by conditioning on 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗ as

𝑃𝑃cont (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) = (1 − 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ))𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗

+(1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 )𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 )𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 )

(10)

for 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗ , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝒮𝒮 and 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 0, where 𝑃𝑃hc is defined as the probability of having a line failure that results in a
△

higher capacity of the failed lines than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . In (10), 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝖯𝖯{𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) ≠ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗ |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) ≠
△

𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ } and (1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗ ,𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 )𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) = 𝖯𝖯{𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 |𝑋𝑋 (ℓ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) ≠ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗∗ , 𝑋𝑋 (ℓ+1) ≠ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗ }.

The empirically calculated 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 )as a function of 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is shown in Fig. 7 with the same simulation
settings as that of the previous subsection. Our simulation results show strong evidence
that 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 affect 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ). Results suggest that regardless of the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 value of the power-grid state,
as Fi increases the probability that a line with capacity larger than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 fails increases. This is meaningful
because, as the number of failures increases the power grid becomes vulnerable and hence large transmission
lines may be affected by contingencies. Moreover, the ratio of the number of transmission lines with capacity
larger than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 to the total number of functional lines increases with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 . The next general observation
from Fig. 7 is that for the same 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 value, as 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 increases the probability that a line with capacity larger
than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 fails decreases. This is mainly due to decrease in the number of lines with capacity value larger
than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (as 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 increases). Furthermore, it is less likely to have states with 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 value after 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 reaches a
certain threshold denoted by Γ𝑖𝑖 (the value of Γ𝑖𝑖 increases as 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 increases). This means that
as Fi approaches Γ𝑖𝑖 , line failures with capacity larger than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 become highly likely.

Fig. 7. Simulation results of Phc(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) as a function of Fi and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 for 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7,𝑒𝑒 = 0.1 and 𝜃𝜃 = 0.1.

Based upon our simulations, the role of 𝜃𝜃, 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑒𝑒 in 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 )is subtle. Therefore, in this paper, we
approximate 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) for different operating characteristics of the power grid with a fixed function. The above
trends in 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) are captured by

𝛼𝛼(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽)3 , 2 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ≤ Γ𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) = �
(11)
1,
Γ𝑖𝑖 < 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖

for 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒮𝒮, where 𝛼𝛼 = 6 × 10−7 and 𝛽𝛽 is 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 dependent. The parametric 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 )'s are shown in Fig. 7. Note
that the overestimation of the curves in Fig. 7 is due to employing a common parametric model for various
operating settings as well as the introduced parameter Γ𝑖𝑖 (there are no simulation data when 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is beyond Γ𝑖𝑖 .)
Next, we find the parametric formulation for 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ). Our simulation results suggest
that 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 play key roles in determining 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ). Fig. 8 shows the empirically
calculated 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) as a function of 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . From Fig. 8, we observe that, conditional on the
occurrence of an additional failure with capacity larger than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , the probability of transitioning to
state 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 decreases as 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 increases. The results suggest that lines with capacity value close to 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 have a
higher probability of failure than those with much larger capacities than 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . We also observe that the

probability of transitioning to state Sj increases as 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 increases. This is because the power grid becomes more
vulnerable when 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is large. By comparing the simulation results corresponding to two values of 𝜃𝜃 in Fig. 8,
we conclude that the role of 𝜃𝜃 in 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) is also subtle and, similarly to 𝑃𝑃hc (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ), the effect of operating
characteristics on 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) is not considered. To capture the described trends, 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) is modeled
parametrically as

𝑃𝑃

𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) = ∑

𝑤𝑤(𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 )

𝑘𝑘:𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 >𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖

𝑤𝑤(𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 )

(12)

where 𝑤𝑤(𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 ) is what we term the weight of transition to a state with the maximum capacity of the failed line
equal to 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 . We have assigned these weights such that they approximate the simulation results presented
in Fig. 8 using (12). Here, the value of the weights are set to 𝑤𝑤(80MW) = 2.2, 𝑤𝑤(200MW) =
EMC
1.5, 𝑤𝑤(500MW) = 0.5, and 𝑤𝑤(1500MW) = 0.01. This completes the modeling of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
presented in (2).

Fig. 8. Simulation results of 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ) as a function of 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 for 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7 and 𝑒𝑒 = 0.1 and two
values of 𝜃𝜃. The parametric approximations are represented by solid lines.

SECTION C. Effects of Operating Characteristics on SASE Parameters
The SASE model parameters 𝑎𝑎1 , … , 𝑎𝑎4 determine different cascading behaviors. These parameters may vary
under different operating conditions and also across different power grids due to different connectivity pattern
and components characteristics. Recall that we made the general observation that the power grid is more
reliable when a1,…,a4 are larger. To illustrate the effects of operating characteristics on 𝑎𝑎1 , … , 𝑎𝑎4 , the values of
these parameters (obtained based upon simulation results) are shown in Figs. 9 and 10 for
different 𝜃𝜃, 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑒𝑒 values. Our simulation results suggest that the power grid is more reliable (𝑎𝑎1 , … , 𝑎𝑎4 are
larger) when 𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒, and 𝜃𝜃 are small. We observe that when any of the 𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒, and 𝜃𝜃 parameter increase they add
more stress to the system and the effect of contingencies becomes larger. Therefore, the probability of an
additional failure in the system increases (𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑎𝑎3 , and 𝑎𝑎4 decrease). We also observe that when any of 𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒,
or 𝜃𝜃 increase, the cascading failure enters the rapid escalation phase with smaller number of failures
(𝑎𝑎2 decreases).

Fig. 9. SASE-model parameters (a) 𝑎𝑎1 , (b) 𝑎𝑎2 , (c) 𝑎𝑎3 , and (d) 𝑎𝑎4 as a function of 𝑟𝑟 parameterized by 𝑒𝑒.

Fig. 10. SASE-model parameters (a) 𝑎𝑎1 , (b) 𝑎𝑎2 , (c) 𝑎𝑎3 , and (d) 𝑎𝑎4 as a function of 𝑒𝑒 parameterized by 𝜃𝜃.

SECTION VII. Analysis of the SASE Model

Here, we analyze the SASE model by understanding the properties of the transition probability matrix 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡). To
simplify the analysis, we first rearrange the indices of states in 𝒮𝒮 by following three simple rules so
that 𝐐𝐐 becomes upper diagonal matrix denoted by 𝐐𝐐𝑑𝑑 . The three rules pertain the indices of states in 𝐐𝐐𝑑𝑑 such
that: 1) 𝑖𝑖 < 𝑗𝑗 if 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 < 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 ; 2) 𝑖𝑖 < 𝑗𝑗 if 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 but 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ; and 3) 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑖𝑖 + 1 if 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,
but 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 0 and 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 1. Note that the SASE Markov chain is not irreducible (and hence not ergodic) because 𝐐𝐐𝑑𝑑 is
upper diagonal. This further implies that there is no stationary distribution for the SASE model and the canonical
limit theorems of ergodic Markov chains are not applicable. Regardless, 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡) is governed by

𝐏𝐏 ′ (𝑡𝑡) = 𝐐𝐐𝑑𝑑 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡) (13)

where 𝐏𝐏 ′ (𝑡𝑡) denotes the matrix whose elements are time derivative of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) [17]. In principle, the solution
𝑑𝑑

of (13) is given by 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑒𝑒 𝐐𝐐 𝑡𝑡 𝐏𝐏(0). While the numerical solutions of 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡) can be easily obtained, to have better
insight we pursue an analytical approach which can result in the asymptotic solution of 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡). To do so, the
eigenvalues 𝜆𝜆1 , 𝜆𝜆2 , … , 𝜆𝜆𝑁𝑁 of 𝐐𝐐𝑑𝑑 and a complete system of associated right eigenvectors 𝐮𝐮𝟏𝟏 , 𝐮𝐮𝟐𝟐 , … , 𝐮𝐮𝑵𝑵 need to be

𝑑𝑑

determined. Then, 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡) can be represented as 𝐏𝐏(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑒𝑒 𝐐𝐐 𝑡𝑡 = 𝐔𝐔Λ(𝑡𝑡)𝐕𝐕, where 𝐔𝐔 is the matrix whose column
vectors are 𝐮𝐮𝟏𝟏 , 𝐮𝐮𝟐𝟐 , … , 𝐮𝐮𝑵𝑵 and 𝐕𝐕 = 𝐔𝐔 −1 . The matrix Λ(𝑡𝑡) is diagonal with 𝑒𝑒 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as its 𝑖𝑖th diagonal element.

Due to the upper diagonal form of 𝐐𝐐𝑑𝑑 and by carrying out simple matrix manipulations, we can express 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) as

𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝑖𝑖<𝑘𝑘<𝑗𝑗 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 (14)
△

△

where 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐔𝐔(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗)𝐕𝐕(𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗) and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐔𝐔(𝑖𝑖, 𝑘𝑘)𝐕𝐕(𝑖𝑖, 𝑘𝑘). Notice that 𝐕𝐕(𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗) = 1/𝐔𝐔(𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗) for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑁𝑁. Since 𝐐𝐐𝑑𝑑 is
upper diagonal 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 is negative for all 𝑘𝑘, and hence 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
𝑡𝑡→∞

Now, let 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) be the conditional probability of reaching a state with 𝑀𝑀 or more failures by time 𝑡𝑡 starting
from an initial state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . The 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) can be obtained as follows:

𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) = ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛=𝑀𝑀 ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝒥𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) (15)

△

where 𝒥𝒥𝑛𝑛 represents the set of indices of states with 𝑛𝑛 failures, i.e., 𝒥𝒥𝑛𝑛 = {𝑗𝑗: 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 = 𝑛𝑛}. The 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) estimates
the evolution of the risk of cascading failures in time.
Further, using the asymptotic analysis, we can derive the conditional probability that a power grid eventually
reaches a state with 𝑛𝑛 failures from an initial state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 defined as
△

𝐷𝐷(𝑛𝑛|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) = ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝒥𝑛𝑛 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝒥𝑛𝑛 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (16)
𝑡𝑡→∞

Hence, the probability mass function (PMF) of the blackout size, conditional on the initial state, can be
computed by calculating 𝐷𝐷(𝑛𝑛|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) for 𝑛𝑛 = 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝑚𝑚.

SECTION VIII. Results

Here, we present results obtained from the SASE model applied to IEEE-118 bus system.

A. Conditional Blackout Probability

The PMF of the blackout size conditional on the initial state 𝐷𝐷(𝑛𝑛|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) is calculated using (16) and shown
in Fig. 11 for a fixed initial state with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 2 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 20 MW. Fig. 11 also shows the effects of the operating
characteristics of the power grid on 𝐷𝐷(𝑛𝑛|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ). The results suggest that, when the power grid operates under a
reliable operating configuration (small values of 𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒 and 𝜃𝜃) the PMF of the blackout size has an exponential
decay, which has also been observed empirically by Dobson (see Figs. 1, 2 in [12]) using real outage
datasets [14]. On the other hand, when the power grid is stressed (large values of 𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒 and 𝜃𝜃) the probability of
large blackouts increases and a hump appears near the tail of the PMF. These conclusions from the analytical
SASE model are confirmed by power-system simulation results as shown in Fig. 12. Note that the set of
simulation results used to validate these conditional probabilities are different from the set of results used to
identify the model parameters. All in all, these results validate that the SASE model with its low-dimensional,
abstract state space is effective in capturing the dynamics of cascading failures in the power grid.

Fig. 11. Conditional PMF of the blackout size for four operating-characteristic settings and 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 2 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =20
MW.

Fig. 12. Analytical and empirical conditional PMF of the blackout size (a) without stress, i.e., 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑒 = 0.25
and 𝜃𝜃 = 0, and (b) with stress, i.e., 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑒 = 0.35 and 𝜃𝜃 = 0.2, for the initial state with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 2 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =
20 MW.

Note that the average size of cascading failures is approximately four in the scenario without stress [Fig. 12(a)]
while this number is approximately 61 in the scenario with stress [Fig. 12(b)]. Therefore, one could use the SASE
model to characterize the conditions for occurrence of large blackouts by identifying the operating
characteristics that result in a hump in the tail of the PMF.
Next, consider the conditional probability of reaching a blackout state with at least 𝑀𝑀 failures from an initial
△

state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 denoted by 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀) = ∑𝑚𝑚
𝐷𝐷(𝑛𝑛|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ). For a fixed 𝑀𝑀 and 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 2 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 20 MW, the dependence
𝑛𝑛=𝑀𝑀
of 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀) on 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑒𝑒 is shown in Fig. 13(a) and on 𝑒𝑒 and 𝜃𝜃 in Fig. 13(b). As expected, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀) increases with 𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒,
and 𝜃𝜃. The results also suggest that at certain settings of the operating characteristics, a phase transition occurs
in the blackout probability. This represents the critical operating settings for which the power grid becomes
highly vulnerable to cascading failures.

Fig. 13. Conditional blackout probability 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 (𝑀𝑀) for 𝑀𝑀 = 40 as a function of (a) 𝑟𝑟 parameterized by 𝑒𝑒 and
(b) eparameterized by 𝜃𝜃 for the initial state with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 2 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 20 MW.

B. Conditional Blackout Probability as a Function of Time
The numerical results of the conditional blackout probability 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) are calculated using (13)and (15). As a
representative example, we have calculated 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡, 30|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) for 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑒 = 0.2 and 𝜃𝜃 = 0.1 for different initial
states, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , as shown in Fig. 14. As the results show, the values of 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 associated with the initial state
affect the evolution of the blackout probability. In particular, both the probability of reaching a power-grid state
with 𝑀𝑀 or more failures and its rate of change during escalation phase increase with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . We reiterate
that while we have assumed a single-line failure at a time in our model, the escalation phase in the cascading
failure occurs as a result of shorter time between failures due to higher transition rates for such states (as the
transition rates are state dependent). Also, note that 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) exhibits three phases. Interestingly, the threephase theme of cascading failures were also seen in the behavior of the cascade-stop probability as well as the
evolution of the accumulative number of failures.

Fig. 14. Probability of reaching a blackout, 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ), with 𝑀𝑀 = 30 or more failures for 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑒 = 0.2, 𝜃𝜃 =
0.1, and initial states (a) with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 3 and (b) with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 6, and different values of 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 .

C. Failure Evolution

Fig. 15 shows four realizations of the cascading-failure scenarios in terms of the evolution of the cumulative
number of failures obtained using the SASE Markov chain. The initial state of the power grid in all the four
realizations has two line failures with 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 80 MW. Note that, in the realization with 163 eventual failures,
the number of failures increases relatively gently at the beginning; however, failure of a line with large capacity
at 𝑡𝑡 = 10 min results in rapid increase in the number of failures in the power grid. In contrast, the number of
failures in other realizations increases rapidly right from the beginning but they transit to stable state earlier as
the value of 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) in these cases is larger. Note that, from Fig. 15, we observe similar forms to those shown
in Fig. 2 for the historical blackouts.

Fig. 15. Realizations of the evolution of the cumulative line failures using the SASE model for 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑒 =
0.2, 𝜃𝜃 = 0.1, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 2, and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 80 MW.

D. Size of the Cascading Failures

To assess the severity of cascading failures, we consider the number of subsequent failures induced by each
△

initial failure. For a given initial state 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 initial failures, we define 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖end )/𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 , where 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖end is the
random variable for the final number of failures in the power grid after cascading failure ends. Here, we study
the mean of 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as a metric representing the severity of cascading failures, which can be calculated as 𝖤𝖤[𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ] =
∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)(𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 )/𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 . (For this metric to be meaningful, the initial number of failures 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 must be small,
𝑡𝑡→∞

which in general is met in most real scenarios.) Figs. 16 and 17 show that 𝖤𝖤[𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ] (for 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 3) increases
with 𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒 and 𝜃𝜃. From results in Fig. 16, we observe that there is a critical value of load-shedding constraint level
(approximately 𝜃𝜃 = 0.2) above which strong cascading behavior is observed. Furthermore, this trend becomes
more evident and aggressive as the capacity estimation error 𝑒𝑒 increases. Similarly, the results in Fig. 17 suggests
that there is a critical loading level (approximately 𝑟𝑟 = 0.8) for which the rate of change in E[RSi] increases
abruptly for all values of e. We reiterate that the N-1 security has been ensured in all loading levels of the power
grid; therefore, the initial contingency is assumed to have at least two initial failures.

Fig. 16. 𝖤𝖤[𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ] for the IEEE 118-bus system as a function of load-shedding constraint level 𝜃𝜃 and the capacity
estimation error 𝑒𝑒 for 𝑟𝑟 = 0.7 and the initial state with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 3 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 20 MW.

Fig. 17. 𝖤𝖤[𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ] for the IEEE 118-bus system as a function of the power-grid loading level 𝑟𝑟 and the capacity
estimation error 𝑒𝑒 for 𝜃𝜃 = 0 and the initial state with 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 3 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 20 MW.

SECTION IX. Conclusion
We have developed a scalable and analytically tractable probabilistic model, termed the stochastic abstractstate evolution model, which describes the dynamics of cascading failures based upon Markov chains. The state

space of the SASE model is defined by a reduced, abstract state space that retains key physical attributes of the
power grid. We have formulated the state-dependent transition rates associated with the SASE model in terms
of key operating characteristics of the power grid including the power-grid loading level, transmission-capacity
estimation error, and constraints in implementing load shedding. The temporal analysis of the SASE model and
its asymptotic behavior together enable determining the probability mass function of the blackout size, the
evolution of the blackout probability from a specific initial state, as well as assessing the severity of the
cascading behavior as a function of various operating settings of the power grid. The SASE model also enables
the identification of critical regions of the space of key power-grid operating characteristics for which severe
cascading behavior may occur.

Appendix Derivation of (7)
We start by defining the following events: 1) 𝐸𝐸stop , which is the event that cascade-stop transition occurs; 2) 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,
which is the event that the power grid has 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 failures; and 3) 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , which is the event that the maximum
capacity of the failed lines in the power grid is 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . Note that 𝑃𝑃stop (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) is the conditional

probability 𝖯𝖯 �𝐸𝐸stop �𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �. Next, we use the simple approach used in [26], in conjunction with certain

reasonable assumptions to approximately represent 𝖯𝖯 �𝐸𝐸stop �𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �in terms of a weighted superposition
of 𝖯𝖯�𝐸𝐸stop �𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 � and 𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }. We begin by noting that multiple application of Bayes rule yields

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }
=

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop ∩𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 }𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 |𝐸𝐸stop ∩𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 }
𝑖𝑖

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∩𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }
𝑖𝑖

(17)

.

Using the representation in (17), we can write

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }
= 𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 }

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 |𝐸𝐸stop ∩𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 } (18)
𝑖𝑖

.

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 )}
𝑖𝑖

With a similar approach, we can also write

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }

= 𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 |𝐸𝐸stop ∩𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 } (19)
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 |𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }
𝑖𝑖

Now, using (18) and (19), we can write

.

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }
= 𝑤𝑤𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 }

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 |𝐸𝐸stop ∩𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 }
𝑖𝑖

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 }
𝑖𝑖

+(1 − 𝑤𝑤)𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }

𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 |𝐸𝐸stop ∩𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 }
𝑖𝑖

𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 |𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 }
𝑖𝑖

(20)

(1)

(2)

where 𝑤𝑤 ∈ [0,1]. In this paper, 𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 } and 𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸stop |𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 } are denoted by 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑃𝑃stop (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ),
respectively.

Next, we assume that the dependence of the event 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 on the event 𝐸𝐸stop is weaker than the dependence of

the event 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 on the event 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 , which implies that 𝖯𝖯{𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 |𝐸𝐸stop ∩ 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 } ≈ 𝖯𝖯 �𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 �. This simplifying

assumption can be justified from the physical characteristics of power grids. Based on our simulation results, we
know that given that 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is large, there is a high probability that 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is also large; on the other hand, when Fi is
small then the probability of having large 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is small. For example, when 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is large the probability of high
capacity line failures increases due to high stress on the system and the large ratio of the number of high
capacity lines to the total number of lines in the system. Therefore, although the knowledge of event 𝐸𝐸stop adds
information about the occurrence of the event 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 we assume that it does not significantly alter the
probability distribution of the event 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 given 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 . Similarly to the previous assumption, we assume that the

dependence of the event EFi on the event 𝐸𝐸stop is weaker than the dependence of the event 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 on the
event 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . Hence, when 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is small then the probability of Fi being large is small and 𝐸𝐸stop does not alter
this probability significantly. These assumptions enable us to approximate (20) by (7).
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